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 Land use issues generally are perceived as questions to be resolved by municipal and state 
governments.  Local conditions shape these decisions, and courts usually defer to the judgment of 
local governments in determining how best to carry out land-use decisions and comprehensive 
planning efforts.  Each land-use action of a local government, though, operates within a larger 
framework that is bounded by the federal constitution.  The Fifth Amendment provides limits on land-
use planning through its mandate that the government shall not deprive an individual of property unless 
it is for “public use” and “with just compensation.”  Commonly known as the “Takings Clause,” this legal 
measure ensures that all levels of government cannot abuse their powers of land-use control and 
eminent domain.  Most land-use controversies do not rise to the federal level, but takings jurisprudence 
over the past fifty years shows an increasing number of cases which involve questions of government 
overreaching onto private property rights. 
 The recent Kelo v. City of New London decision (June 2005) adds to the growing line of case 
law that deals with property rights.  Kelo’s central issue involves whether a local government may use 
its powers of eminent domain to condemn property and sell or lease it to a private developer who is 
operating within a formal economic development plan created by the local government.  Grossly 
simplified by the press as a contest between poor homeowners and a greedy government’s desire to 
take their homes and give them to private developers, the case excited the popular imagination in a 
way that is odd for land-use decisions.  Bolstered by the growing property rights movement and the 
emotional elements associated with removing individuals from their homes, the case mushroomed into 
a bipartisan cause that extended beyond the planning and real estate professions.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in favor of New London prompted a national cry of outrage and led to a rush to tighten 
eminent domain laws at all levels.  The strong reaction suggests that Kelo was a landmark case in the 
course of takings jurisprudence.  Given a solid line of federal precedent, though, Kelo is not a 
remarkable decision.  The backlash that it has engendered, though, is notable, and this fallout 
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promises to have an immediate and direct impact on land-use planning and community development.  
Kelo’s deference to land-use decisions made by local governments may have the unintended 
consequence of stripping these governments of important legal and financial tools needed for sound, 
comprehensive community planning. 
 
Definitions of Takings and Eminent Domain       
Federal Definitions 
The Kelo case hinged upon the Supreme Court’s definition of eminent domain.  Derived from English 
common law, eminent domain is a power assigned to the states and the federal government by 
implication in the Constitution.  The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall be . . . deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”    The last provision, known as the “Takings Clause,” allows government to 
seize private properties for “public use,” as long as the government provides adequate compensation 
for the value of the taken property.  “Public use” exists as the only federal limitation on eminent domain, 
but legal scholars have found little evidence to explain why the Framers of the Constitution included 
this phrase and what they intended it to mean.1  This vague phrase has formed the basis of federal 
case law for centuries, and courts have struggled with determining the precise constitutional limits on 
eminent domain imposed by this phrase.  Over the years, the “public use” requirement of the “Takings 
Clause” has been expanded to encompass a variety of development actions undertaken by all levels of 
government. 
 
 
                                                   
1 Pritchett, Wendell E.  (2003).  The “Public Menace” of Blight:  Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain.  
Yale Law and Policy Review 21:  9. 
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State Definitions 
 State law, though, has provided more definite limitations on the power of eminent domain.  The 
federal constitutional definition serves only as a baseline condition for state law; thus, states are free to 
impose greater restrictions upon the use of eminent domain.2  Since the power of eminent domain rests 
with the state, each state must authorize its municipalities to use the power of eminent domain granted 
by the Constitution.  This is done through state constitutions and/or enabling legislation.  Following the 
lead of the federal constitution, forty-nine of the states adopted state constitutional language that 
parallels the “public use” limitation of the Constitution.  North Carolina is the only state without an 
explicit “takings clause” in its constitution, but it “implies public use restrictions through common law 
precedent.”3 
 All states have legislation that authorizes the use of eminent domain by municipalities and 
provides explicit limitations on the eminent domain process.  These statutes set forth a detailed 
process that the state and its municipalities must follow when exercising their powers of eminent 
domain.  States provide different limitations on the use of eminent domain; many states confine its use 
only to situations where land must be taken for public improvements or where “blight” is present, 
whereas others explicitly permit a broader range of uses, such as the taking of land for economic 
development projects.   
 
North Carolina  
 
North Carolina’s eminent domain statutes follow the general form used by the majority of the 
states.  Section 40A of the North Carolina General Statutes outlines the basic procedure for eminent 
domain as used by a public or private condemnor.  Under N.C.G.S. § 40A-3(b), a municipality may use 
                                                   
2 The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment’s restrictions on takings apply to each state. 
3 Hellegers, Adam P.  2001.  Eminent Domain as an Economic Development Tool:  A Proposal to Reform HUD 
Displacement Policy.  Law Review of Mississippi State University 3:  945. 
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eminent domain “for the public use or benefit” to condemn private land for improving or constructing 
streets and sidewalks, playgrounds and parks, sewer and drainage systems, hospitals, libraries, fire 
stations, municipal office buildings, or any other building to be used by the municipal government.  In 
addition, the power of eminent domain may be exercised by private condemnors, such as railroad or 
utility companies, to obtain land for the construction of public utilities or transportation systems.4 
 Once a “public benefit” has been established, the local government must give notice of its 
intent to condemn the property and must determine an amount to be paid for the property that will 
provide “just compensation” for the landowner.5  This notice must be sent to the landowner via certified 
mail and must also contain a statement of the “purpose for which the property is being condemned” 
and “the date [the] condemnor intends to file the complaint” in court.6  When the municipality institutes 
the civil action, it shall also deposit the amount it has determined as reasonable compensation with the 
court.7  Once this occurs, the owner of the property has three options:  accept the complaint, allow the 
title of the property to vest in the municipality, and apply to the court for payment of the “just 
compensation”8; challenge the municipality’s determination of “just compensation” only and allow the 
title of the property to pass to the municipality9; or challenge the eminent domain action entirely by 
requesting an injunction against the municipality.10  If “just compensation” is challenged, the judge, jury, 
or an appointed commission will hear the case and award the landowner a sum based on the fair 
market value of the property prior to the filing of the complaint, plus the legal rate of interest measured 
                                                   
4 N.C.G.S. § 40A-3(a) (2005). 
5 N.C.G.S. § 40A-40(a) (2005). 
6Ibid. 
7 N.C.G.S. § 40A-41 (2005). 
8 N.C.G.S. § 40A-44 (2005). 
9 N.C.G.S. §§ 40A-42(b)(2) and 40A-45 (2005). 
10 This is not a statutory remedy in Section 40A.  Instead, the statutes assume a “public benefit” and anticipate only a 
challenge by the landowner to the amount determined by the municipality to be “just compensation.” 
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from the date that the municipality acquires title to the property.11  
 In addition to the standard eminent domain process, a “quick take” provision is also available 
for municipalities.  This procedure may be used in actions that involve the taking of property for “such 
enterprises as electric power generation and distribution systems, sewage collection and treatment 
systems, gas production and distribution systems, solid waste collection and disposal systems, cable 
television, and streets.”12  Under N.C.G.S. 40A-42(a), a municipality may use this procedure to acquire 
title to the desired property and the right to immediate possession at the time that it files the complaint 
and makes the deposit of “just compensation” with the court.  This can only be pre-empted by the 
private landowner filing an injunction prior to the municipality’s filing of a complaint. 
 In addition to the standard eminent domain procedure in Section 40A, North Carolina law also 
provides municipalities with the ability to use eminent domain for redevelopment purposes.  These 
redevelopment provisions mirror those of other states and remain on the books as evidence of urban 
renewal policies.  Initiated in 1951 for residential properties and expanded in 1961 to include 
commercial properties, Chapter 160A’s “Urban Development Law” outlines procedures a municipality 
may use to take “blighted” property in order to redevelop it for new housing or commercial uses or to 
take property in order to prevent an area from becoming “blighted.”  N.C.G.S. § 160A-501 explains that 
“blighted areas” are “economic or social liabilities, inimical and injurious to the public health, safety, 
morals and welfare of the residents of the State, harmful to the social and economic well-being of the 
entire communities in which they exist, depreciating values therein, reducing tax revenues, and thereby 
                                                   
11 N.C.G.S. §§ 40A-52, 40A-53, and 40A-63 (2005).  This provision prevents the municipality from having to pay any 
increase in value associated with the municipality’s future plans for the project  The fair market value prior to the filing of the 
complaint is usually determined to be the property value that is on the tax records at the time of the civil action.  Given that 
municipalities in North Carolina are not required to conduct property re-evaluations any more frequently than each seven 
years, this could lead to a result in which “just compensation” is determined to be a property value on the tax records from 
up to seven years prior to the proceeding. 
12 Loeb, Ben F., Jr., and David Lawrence.  1995.  City Property:  Acquisition, Sale, and Disposition.  In Municipal 
Government in North Carolina, edited by David M. Lawrence and Warren Jake Wicker.  Chapel Hill, NC:  The Institute of 
Government:  468. 
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depreciating further the general community-wide values.”  Eminent domain, then, may be used as a 
means of achieving the “public purposes of acquiring and replanning such areas and of holding and 
disposing of them in such manner that they shall become available for economically and socially sound 
redevelopment.”13 
 Under redevelopment law, a municipality must create a redevelopment commission or housing 
authority that is a body distinct from the governing board.14  This commission may be comprised of the 
exact same members as the governing board, but the commission has independent authority to enter 
into contracts, purchase and sell property, borrow money, and invest the funds that it receives from its 
redevelopment activities.15  In order to initiate a redevelopment project that utilizes eminent domain for 
parcel assembly, the commission or authority must first prepare a redevelopment plan pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 160A-513.  This plan must link to the municipality’s comprehensive plan (if one exists) and 
show land uses for the redevelopment area, along with proposed zoning, street, and building 
changes.16  In addition, the plan should include “a statement of a feasible method proposed for the 
relocation of the families displaced” by the redevelopment activities.17  The redevelopment plan must 
be approved by the governing body of the municipality after a public hearing; once this is 
accomplished, the redevelopment commission or housing authority may begin eminent domain 
procedures in accordance with Chapter 40A.   
 One other statutory authorization of eminent domain exists for redevelopment purposes:  the 
“community development” section of Chapter 160A.  Under N.C.G.S. § 160A-456(a)(2)(b), “any city 
council may exercise directly those powers granted by law to municipal redevelopment commissions 
and those powers granted by law to municipal housing authorities, and may do so whether or not a 
                                                   
13 N.C.G.S. § 160A-501 (2005). 
14 N.C.G.S. §§ 160A-504 and 160A-505 (2005). 
15 N.C.G.S. § 160A-512 (2005). 
16 N.C.G.S. § 160A-513(d) (2005).   
17 N.C.G.S. § 160A-513(d)(9) (2005). 
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redevelopment commission or housing authority is in existence in such city.”  This law, passed in 1975 
after the close of the urban renewal period and the end of federal categorical funding for community 
development, enables each municipality to acquire residential, commercial, or industrial land via 
eminent domain, clear these areas, construct site improvements and install infrastructure on these 
parcels, and sell the tracts “to the highest bidder” for “residential, commercial, industrial, or other use or 
for the public use . . . in accordance with the redevelopment plan.”18  Community Development Block 
Grant (CDBG) funds may be allocated to cover expenses incurred in this redevelopment procedure.19  
These “community development” statutes enable a local government to implement eminent domain as 
a means by which to achieve redevelopment goals without having to raise the specter of urban renewal 
through establishment of a redevelopment commission or housing authority.  In addition, these statutes 
permit a municipality to exercise direct control over the use of eminent domain for residential or 
commercial redevelopment.  No separate quasi-governmental body (a commission or authority) exists 
to make broad redevelopment decisions; thus, a council may exert more power over eminent domain, 
yet be held more politically accountable for the results of its decisions. 
 
Massachusetts  
In all states, the power of eminent domain is usually exercised by the state or the local 
governing board.  Other groups may also be statutorily authorized to use eminent domain, such as 
private transportation or utility corporations, or quasi-governmental entities such as a housing authority 
or a turnpike authority.  In Massachusetts, however, redevelopment law permits additional 
organizations to use eminent domain for redevelopment purposes.  Under M.G.L. Chapter 121A, 
Section 3, a group of persons may form a corporation “for the purpose of undertaking and carrying out 
                                                   
18 N.C.G.S. § 160A-503(19) (2005). 
19 N.C.G.S. § 160A-456(d) (2005). 
       8
in the city of Boston a project authorized and approved by the Boston Redevelopment Authority or for 
the purpose of undertaking and carrying out in any other city or town a project authorized and approved 
. . . by the housing board.”  In addition, a “charitable corporation” may also be “empowered to act as a 
Urban Redevelopment Corporation . . . for the purpose of rehabilitating and improving residential 
housing.”20  M.G.L. Chapter 121A, Section 11 gives these non-governmental corporations the authority 
to use eminent domain to acquire land for redevelopment projects, subject to the approval of the local 
housing board.  Although the redevelopment purposes mirror those of other states, the delegation of 
the power of eminent domain to non-governmental groups provides Massachusetts communities with 
additional power to effect community development projects. 
 
Problematic Statutory Definitions  
Although detailed statutory provisions furnish strict mandates for the process of using eminent 
domain, many have been faulted for the wide latitude that their language gives to purposes for using 
eminent domain.  Particularly notable are varying definitions of “blight” in urban redevelopment 
statutes.  “Blight” may be described in vague terms that permit a variety of eminent domain actions, or 
it may be so detailed as to give a number of small hooks on which to hang justifications for eminent 
domain.  For example, West Virginia’s redevelopment statutes focus on “slum areas” and “blighted 
areas.”  A “slum area” is  
 an area in which there is a predominance of buildings or improvements (or which is 
  predominantly residential in character), and which, by reason of dilapidation,  
 deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, 
 sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, or 
 the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, 
 or any combination of such factors, is conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, 
 infant mortality, juvenile delinquency and crime, and is detrimental to the 
 public health, safety, morals, or welfare.21   
                                                   
20 M.G.L. Ch. 121A, Sec. 3 (2005). 
21 W. Va. Code § 16-18-3 (2005). 
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This language tends to evoke images of inhumane conditions targeted by nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century reformers and can be seen as a clear justification for redevelopment of an 
impoverished area.  However, the statutory category of “blighted areas” gives greater latitude to the 
use of eminent domain.  A “blighted area” is  
 an area (other than a slum area) which by reason of the predominance of  
 defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, 
 accessibility or usefulness, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site 
 improvement, diversity of ownership, tax or special assessment delinquency 
 exceeding the fair value of the land, defective or unusual conditions of title, improper 
 subdivision or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger 
 life or property by fire and other causes, or any combination of such factors,  
 substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the community, retards the  
 provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability 
 and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its present 
 condition and use.22 
 
Phrases such as “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the community” and “constitutes 
an economic or social liability” can easily be used to encompass a wide range of reasons for eminent 
domain, including the taking of land for economic development projects.  Therefore, state law often 
provides definitions of the purposes of eminent domain that permit a range of explicitly- and implicitly-
authorized activities. 
 
Uses of Eminent Domain 
Historic Uses 
 Local and state governments rarely exercised eminent domain in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, primarily because “there were vast tracts of government-controlled land available 
in the public domain and governmental activities were relatively limited.”23  When governments used 
                                                   
22 Ibid. 
23 Taylor, Elizabeth A.  1995.  The Dudley Street Initiative and the Power of Eminent Domain.  Boston College Law Review 
36:  1063. 
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eminent domain, it was confined almost exclusively to situations in which states condemned land for 
the construction of roads, railroads, canals, and public parks.  In most cases, the public actually did use 
the improvement constructed on the land that had been taken through eminent domain.  Other early 
American examples illustrate a less-definite connection between condemnation and later public use, 
such as a local government’s taking of land adjacent to a grist mill in order to promote the commercial 
operation by allowing the owner to construct a dam across a stream that would flood the transferred 
land.24  Early twentieth-century uses included condemnation for the purpose of obtaining land for utility 
pipes and electric and telephone lines, along with the construction of irrigation projects and drainage 
districts in the arid western states.25  Generally, though, eminent domain was limited to situations in 
which public improvements related to growth needed to be made or common carriers needed land for 
transportation improvements. 
 
Modern Uses 
Urban Renewal  
During the 1930s and 1940s, the federal government passed several laws, such as the 
Housing Acts of 1937, 1949, and 1954, that sought to encourage municipalities to engage in the 
clearance of their older housing stock and the subsequent construction of new, modern units.  These 
acts provided local governments with federal funds for redevelopment activities and sanctioned the use 
of eminent domain by local housing or redevelopment authorities as a primary tool by which to achieve 
the clearance of large, “substandard” areas. 
 Known as the “urban renewal” program, this redevelopment effort “stir[red] hopes” by 
appealing to a variety of interests:  “central-city business interests viewed it as a means of boosting 
                                                   
24 Pathak, Arden Reed.  2004.  The Public Use Doctrine:  In Search of a Limitation on the Exercise of Eminent Domain for 
the Purpose of Economic Development.  Cumberland Law Review 35:  178-179. 
25 American Planning Association.  2005.  Amicus Brief in Kelo v. City of New London. 
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sagging property values; mayors and city councils perceived it as a tool to increase tax revenues; 
social welfare leaders hoped it would clear the slums and better the living conditions of the poor; and, 
more specifically, advocates of low- and moderate-income housing thought it would increase the stock 
of decent, affordable dwellings in the central cities.”26  In practice, though, the legal wording of the acts 
provided large loopholes through which municipalities could construct new revenue-generating projects 
without having to build affordable housing for displaced residents.  Using federal money, local 
governments were able to take large swathes of older neighborhoods through eminent domain, 
justifying their actions as having a “public purpose” because these properties suffered from “blight” 
and/or were “slum” areas.  Federal money also funded the construction of new, high-rent units or 
commercial projects, since the Housing Acts failed to mandate the construction of affordable residential 
units.  Given the choice between clearance and construction of properties that would not generate high 
property tax revenue and those that would, municipalities generally chose to redevelop with the 
“highest and best use” of the properties in mind. 
 As eminent domain was used to displace a large number of residents who tended to be of low-
incomes and of minority or ethnic backgrounds, the procedure became equated with abuses of 
governmental powers.  In many cases, eminent domain became known as “Negro removal,” since it, in 
an urban redevelopment context, had the effect of forcing African-Americans from their traditional 
neighborhoods and replacing them with more affluent white residents.27  Similar problems abounded 
with residents of other ethnicities.  Eminent domain figured prominently in public outcries against the 
effects of the urban renewal (Title I) program and became seen as a major weapon in the “war on the 
poor” that appeared to be occurring in most major cities during the mid-twentieth century. 
      
                                                   
26 Teaford, Jon C.  2000.  Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath.  Housing Policy Debate 11:  444. 
27 Ibid, p. 447. 
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The Boston Redevelopment Authority 
 One of the most well-known examples of large-scale eminent domain use in the urban renewal 
program occurred in Boston, MA during the 1950s and early 1960s.  Mayor John B. Hynes made the 
renewal of Boston’s business districts one of his top priorities, and the City Planning Board determined 
that “the renewal of blighted areas immediately abutting downtown Boston was an essential part of the 
overall process.”28  The City saw an opportunity to use federal funds to achieve this goal, particularly 
since the Housing Act of 1954 could provide up to thirty percent of funding for non-residential and 
industrial projects that were constructed in accordance with a redevelopment plan.29  One major “slum” 
area that the City sought to clear was the West End, a densely-populated ethnic neighborhood just 
north of Beacon Hill and Boston’s business and government center.  During the mid-1950s, the area 
housed about seven thousand residents in twenty-eight hundred units.30  City leaders viewed this area 
as severely “blighted,” citing narrow streets, overcrowded apartments, and fire hazards as reasons for 
redevelopment.  According to one local banker, “’There’s only one way you can cure a place like the 
West End, and that is to wipe it out.  It’s a cancer in the long run to the community.’”31 
 The City secured approval for its West End Project in 1956 (three years after the formal 
announcement of its plan) and assigned responsibility to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).  
The BRA’s redevelopment plan involved the construction of five residential complexes that included  
tower buildings, smaller apartment buildings, and townhouses.32  Almost five hundred apartments were 
to be created, each of which would rent as a luxury unit, not as affordable housing.33  These units were 
intended to bring young professionals and families back to the city; once there, city officials believed 
                                                   
28 O’Connor, Thomas H.  1993.  Building a New Boston:  Politics and Urban Renewal, 1950 to 1970, p. 124. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, p. 131. 
32 Ibid, p. 132. 
33 Ibid. 
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that these higher-income residents would patronize Boston’s business district instead of shopping and 
seeking personal services in the suburbs.   
Rather than negotiate with individual homeowners and tenants, the BRA decided that the most 
efficient way to accomplish its goals was to take the entire fifty-two area project area through eminent 
domain.  In April 1958, all property owners in the West End Project area received written notification 
from the City stating that the BRA had taken over their properties by eminent domain.  This, according 
to the letter, was done in order to eliminate slums and “blight” and demolition of buildings would begin 
at once.34  The City did not provide relocation housing for the West End residents, and residents had 
little expectation of being able to return to the neighborhood due to the nature of the new housing being 
constructed.  Two years later, the area had been entirely cleared and the West End ceased to exist. 
 The urban renewal project in the West End shocked many individuals in Boston into realizing 
that the same thing could happen to their neighborhoods.  Public outcry against the destruction of the 
West End ran high, but city officials forged ahead with redevelopment efforts fueled by the power of 
eminent domain.  In 1960, Mayor John Collins hired Ed Logue to head the BRA.  Under Logue’s 
direction, the BRA took a more subtle and sensitive approach to urban renewal, but it still relied 
frequently on eminent domain to achieve its goals.  Notable projects during Logue’s tenure included the 
razing of Scollay Square for the new Government Center, the construction of the Prudential Center on 
abandoned Back Bay railyards, and housing redevelopment projects in Allston-Brighton, Charlestown, 
and the South End. 
 
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative  
 The activities of the BRA during the 1950s and 1960s placed a sinister cast on the City’s use of 
eminent domain.  Decades later, this planning tool was viewed with suspicion by residents throughout 
                                                   
34 Ibid, p. 136. 
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Boston.  The use of eminent domain had become aligned with the specter of big government using its 
power to take advantage of (and the properties of) its most vulnerable citizens. 
 In contrast, though, Boston also presents an example of community-sensitive, “ground-up” use 
of eminent domain for neighborhood redevelopment.  Resident-driven community development efforts 
are rare, and rarer still are those in which residents have been allowed to use eminent domain as a 
means by which to advance their community development objectives.  One notable example of both of 
the above is the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), a non-profit community development 
group that operates within the Dudley Street area of Roxbury, one of Boston’s poorest neighborhoods.  
In the 1980s, this neighborhood was characterized by massive disinvestment, a low owner-occupancy 
rate, high poverty, illegal dumping, and a large number of vacant lots and abandoned housing units.   
Working with its own resident-controlled board to create a master plan for the Dudley Street 
community, DSNI envisioned the creation of a “village concept [that would] ‘foster human growth, 
where people have choice and opportunity.’”35  This community plan sought “development without 
displacement” and proposed new construction of between 800 and 1,000 housing units and the 
rehabilitation of 1,000 units for affordable housing within the immediate neighborhood.36  The problem 
presented, though, was one of parcel assembly and cost, for the majority of the properties were in tax 
foreclosure and those that were not owned by the City generally were owned by absentee property 
holders.37  The number of tax delinquent lots discouraged DSNI, for “foreclosing on them one by one 
would be a complicated and time-consuming process.”38  Thus, DSNI decided to pursue the remedy of 
                                                   
35 Medoff, Peter, and Holly Sklar.  1994.  Streets of Hope:  The Fall and Rise of an Urban Neighborhood.  Boston, MA:  
South End Press:  108. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 117.  Fifteen acres of land were owned by the City of Boston, and 181 lots were privately owned, with 101 of 
these lots being tax delinquent. 
38 Ibid. 
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eminent domain which, under Massachusetts law, could be delegated to a non-profit corporation for a 
redevelopment project.39 
 As discussed above, Chapter 121A of the Massachusetts General Laws delineates the state’s 
redevelopment law and describes a policy goal of “stimulat[ing] the investment of private capital in 
blighted areas that in turn will assist in eliminating existing slums.”40  These statutes permit the 
formation of an “urban redevelopment corporation” that will carry out a redevelopment project with the 
approval of the Boston Redevelopment Authority.41  An urban redevelopment corporation authorized by 
the BRA has the power to “lease land, or acquire land by gift, purchase or exchange, or with approval 
of the housing board, may take land by eminent domain.”42  In order to accomplish its affordable 
housing goals, DSNI decided to apply to the City for approval as an “urban development corporation.”     
 DSNI won the reluctant approval of the Boston Redevelopment Authority and was able to 
obtain a $2 million loan from the Ford Foundation that enabled it to provide “just compensation” for the 
taking of the needed parcels through eminent domain.43  DSNI’s ability to condemn these parcels 
enabled it to begin work on the construction of several groups of affordable housing, which not only 
ameliorated the problems caused by vacant, abandoned, and dilapidated properties, but encouraged 
outside investment in the neighborhood, for the new affordable units caused many former Roxbury 
residents and new low- to moderate-income residents to move into the neighborhood.   
The DSNI example shows that resident-controlled eminent domain can be an effective tool in 
enabling a non-profit organization efficiently and successfully to implement a redevelopment project 
                                                   
39 Interestingly, though, residents initially feared use of eminent domain, for they had seen the devastating effects that 
eminent domain in urban renewal programs had had on Boston’s West End and South End. 
40 Taylor, p. 1075.   
41 Ibid.  A redevelopment project is defined as “Any undertaking consisting of the construction in a blighted, open, decadent 
or sub-standard area of decent, safe, and sanitary residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, recreational or 
governmental buildings and such appurtenant or incidental facilities as shall be in the public interest, and the operation and 
maintenance of such buildings and facilities after construction.” 
42 Ibid. 
43 Medoff and Sklar, p. 154. 
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that improves the physical and social character of a neighborhood.  Unlike earlier urban renewal 
projects in Boston, the Dudley Street project provides an example for the argument that the judicious 
use of eminent domain can be a valuable tool that promotes sensitive redevelopment and community 
unification. 
 
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) 
 Closely related to urban renewal programs, tax increment financing is a development 
management tool that has grown in popularity over the past decade.44  Originally developed in 
California in the 1950s, TIF was intended to be “a local method of self-financing the redevelopment of 
blighted urban areas.”45  Over time, TIF districts were used to fund numerous capital projects in both 
“blighted” and non-“blighted” areas.  Many states currently have legislation that authorizes the use of 
TIF for economic development projects.  Findings of “blight” are not needed in order to implement this 
financing tool.  For example, West Virginia’s TIF legislation provides that a governing body must adopt 
an ordinance that includes “findings that the real property within the development or redevelopment 
project area or district will be benefited by eliminating or preventing the development or spread of 
slums or blighted, deteriorated or deteriorating areas, discouraging the loss of commerce, industry, or 
employment, increasing employment, or any combination thereof.”46 
 TIF provides local governments with a means of financing development projects through 
property tax revenues.  In order to implement TIF, a TIF district must be created.  Within this district, a 
base year is determined, and property taxes are frozen within the district at the base year rate.  This 
will extend over a long period of time, often ten to twenty years.  After the base year, all additional tax 
                                                   
44 Forty-nine states have TIF legislation, including North Carolina, which passed a form of tax increment financing in 
November 2004.  Arizona is the only state that does not authorize TIF as a financing tool. 
45 National Association of Realtors.  2002.  Tax Increment Financing.  Retrieved 14 October 2005 from 
http://www.realtor.org/SG3.nsf/Pages/TIFReport?OpenDocument.  
46 W. Va. Code § 7-11B-7 (2005). 
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revenues generated by the development of the project (which assumes increasing property values and 
thus higher property taxes) belong to the TIF district for the stated period of time.  These monies (the 
“tax increment”) are used to finance various project costs, such as land acquisition and infrastructure 
improvements.47  After the time for the TIF district ends, all tax revenues from the redevelopment 
project then belong entirely to the municipality or county. 
 TIF enabling legislation usually includes authorization for the use of eminent domain by the 
redevelopment authority responsible for administering the TIF project.  As with urban renewal projects, 
eminent domain provides an efficient means by which to assemble parcels for large TIF development 
projects.  The use of eminent domain in TIF districts may generate controversy, just as it did in urban 
renewal projects.  In Wheeling, WV in 2003, city officials created a TIF proposal that would cover a 
large portion of the area south of its historic downtown in order to facilitate a riverside shopping center  
that would include a standard-design Lowe’s Home Improvement Center and a Wal-Mart.  This area 
was home to several commercial uses and a small but tightly-knit working-class neighborhood.  The 
proposed developer allegedly made it known during purchase overtures to the property owners that the 
City was prepared to use eminent domain to acquire their homes and businesses.  A widespread 
protest occurred, and the City was forced to back off of its plans to condemn holdout properties.  Given 
the political storm, the City decided to amend the project boundaries and construct the shopping center 
on a smaller site that specifically excluded the protesting neighborhood.48       
 The Wheeling example underscores the fact that most local governments have an ambivalent 
relationship with eminent domain.  Although it may provide an efficient means of assembling parcels for 
                                                   
47 TIF projects may be financed through a “pay-as-you-go” mechanism, in which yearly tax increases (the “tax increment”) is 
used to pay for a portion of project costs, or by issuing TIF bonds at the beginning of the project.  These bonds provide 
money up front for the project and must be paid off over a period of time designated by statute (usually the length of time in 
which the TIF district will be in existence).  See Property Tax Increment Financing in West Virginia:  A Guide for Counties 
and Class I and II Municipalities (2003). 
48 This may have occurred because property owners involved the Institute for Justice, a Washington, D.C. organization that 
fights against eminent domain abuses, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. 
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redevelopment, the political costs of its use may be high.  High-profile stories of eminent domain 
abuses and the historical example of Boston’s West End have created strong negative associations in 
the popular mind regarding the use of eminent domain.  Many contemporary governments will use 
eminent domain only as a last resort, because the process is highly visible, proceedings are potentially 
costly, and public opinion is particularly volatile on this issue.49     
 
Criticisms of Eminent Domain 
The success of DSNI suggests that eminent domain can be used by neighborhood 
organizations to achieve goals of community development.  This instance of resident-driven eminent 
domain, though, proves to be a highly unusual exception to the norm of government-driven examples, 
such as the BRA example discussed above.  Eminent domain in the hands of municipal governments 
has engendered a significant amount of criticism from displaced residents, legal scholars, and 
advocates for low-income and minority individuals, all of whom point to eminent domain as a highly-
manipulable tool of special interests. 
 
Definitions of “Blight” 
 As previously noted, one criticism of the use of eminent domain focuses on the plasticity of the 
definition of “blight” in redevelopment statutes and how municipalities may interpret this term selectively 
to apply to any property that may be important to their social or economic plans.  Given “the broad 
range of conditions and the degree of subjectivity inherent in such an inquiry, cities can characterize 
almost any area as blighted.”50  This, combined with a legal presumption of validity in favor of municipal 
                                                   
49 The American Planning Association recommends that eminent domain only be “reserved for the most serious cases” of 
barriers to redevelopment.  American Planning Association Policy Guide on Public Redevelopment, p. 8. 
50 Kruckeberg, Jennifer J.  2002.  Can Government Buy Everything?:  The Takings Clause and the Erosion of the “Public 
Use” Requirement.  Minnesota Law Review 87:  573. 
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actions, signals that a municipality has a wide degree of latitude in identifying and “taking” a property 
that it deems necessary for redevelopment.   
  
Residential Displacement and Financial Costs 
The most significant criticisms of the use of eminent domain focus on the negative impacts on 
low-income and minority residents whose properties are “taken” for redevelopment.  Condemnation of 
residential property generally results in displacement of residents, many of whom cannot afford the cost 
of moving to a new unit.  Although the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition 
Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 4622) mandates that the municipality offer each displaced property 
owner a reasonable sum to cover relocation costs, these payments usually do not cover the costs that 
residents must incur in moving.  This relocation assistance does not take into account the difficulty low-
income and minority individuals may have in finding a new, affordable unit (given the presence of 
racism and classism in the housing market and the sheer lack of supply of affordable housing).  In 
addition, the designation of fair market value as “just compensation” for units in a “blighted area” may 
not provide enough money to enable the property owner to purchase a comparable new unit elsewhere 
in the current housing market.  Other financial hardships that result from displacement may include the 
fact that “just compensation” may not provide enough money for a property owner to pay off his or her 
mortgage on the condemned property or that the property may have received CDBG rehabilitation 
monies, in which case the landowner may be obligated to repay these funds to the government since 
he or she will not have lived in the residence for the requisite amount of time for the “loan” to be 
forgiven.  In addition, monetary costs may include the loss of jobs for local residents, for the eminent 
domain action may displace small neighborhood businesses and make it financially impossible for an 
owner to open his or her business in a new location in another part of the city. 
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Social and Emotional Costs 
In addition to financial costs, the condemnation of a property may impose social and emotional 
costs on residents through “the destruction of the community itself.”51  Greater value inheres in a 
property beyond its exchange value, for each resident “faces the challenge of making a life on a real 
estate commodity.”52  The taking of property through eminent domain does not compensate residents 
for the lost use value, or the value assigned to “the bundle of social, familial, business, religious, and 
ethnic ties and relationships [that are] of subjective, nonpecuniary value to a displaced individual.”53  
The loss of use value can have a particularly detrimental impact on the lives of low-income residents, 
for “particularly among the poor, ‘the existence of a matrix of mutually shared values and mutually 
shared concerns and support are necessary conditions not just to psychic well being, but to physical 
survival itself.’”54  The destruction of these vital social networks through eminent domain ensures that 
low-income residents will lose pooled resources on which they depend for daily functioning.  These 
“human costs” may not be recaptured in their new residential locations. 
  
Gentrification 
Eminent domain may also serve to promote gentrification and displacement in areas 
surrounding the redevelopment area.  Thus, many more residents than those whose properties are 
“taken” may be impacted by the use of eminent domain, as the prospect of redevelopment may 
promote increased investment in neighboring areas.  Residents of these fringes may be driven out by 
escalating rents or by the sale of residential rental properties to private developers (who may seek 
rezonings that will permit commercial redevelopment).  Therefore, another group of displaced residents 
                                                   
51 Hellegers, p. 941. 
52 Logan, J., and H. Molotch.  1987.  Urban Fortunes:  The Political Economy of Places.  University of California Press:  99. 
53 Hellegers, p. 941. 
54 Broussard, Keasha.  2000.  Social Consequences of Eminent Domain:  Urban Revitalization Against the Backdrop of the 
Takings Clause.  Law and Psychology Review 24:  111. 
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is forced into the housing market at the same time that residents displaced by eminent domain are 
seeking new housing units.  This sudden increase in demand and a corresponding lack of supply of 
affordable units may mean that many displaced low-income residents end up in units with rents that 
they cannot afford or are forced to live in overcrowded conditions.  In addition, the displaced residents 
will seek new units with rents comparable to those in which they were living.  This suggests that many 
of them will end up in similar low-income areas, and the elimination of one low-income “blighted area” 
can “create an even worse slum given the multiplier effects of concentrated poverty.”55   
Although redevelopment projects claim to replace the affordable units destroyed, “many 
thousands more units have been destroyed by redevelopment than have been constructed, and of 
those units constructed, only a small portion have been affordable to low-income residents.”56  The 
replacement of affordable units in a redevelopment project also does not take into account the 
residents of nearby areas that may be displaced by gentrification.  As gentrification occurs in central-
city sites, the filtering model breaks down, for no new units are created on the fringes of the community.  
Instead, units that are “filtering down” through the housing market are suddenly improved; thus, the 
filtering chain is broken and supply is constricted at the lower end of the market.  This means that low-
income residents will have increasing difficulties in finding new units in the wake of eminent domain 
and the redevelopment process.  
 
Social Injustice Toward Minorities and the Poor 
Eminent domain has also been criticized as promoting social injustice through its deference to 
the elite interests of a municipality’s “growth machine.”  Broad judicial construction of the “public use” 
doctrine enables business leaders and commercial interests to plan projects that will increase tax 
                                                   
55 Broussard, p. 740. 
56 Ibid., p. 739. 
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revenues (or personal profits) for particular pieces of property.  Often, the presence of low-income or 
minority residents in desirable central city areas hinders profit-maximizing.  Although not always driven 
by racism or classism, evidence exists that indicates that many eminent domain proceedings have 
been tainted by “racial animosity” or by “bias against the poor.”57  Statutory provisions like N.C.G.S. 
40A-4 provide that “the power to acquire property by condemnation shall not depend on any prior effort 
to acquire the same property by gift or purchase”; therefore, a municipality may initiate a condemnation 
action without attempting to negotiate for the purchase of the property.  Low-income and minority 
owners may never be given a chance to sell the property on a voluntary basis, for no requirement 
exists for the government to acknowledge their ownership other than through the basic due process 
guarantees of the civil action.  Elite interests may acquire the desired property without having to 
confront the human aspect of the community that will be altered or destroyed by eminent domain.  
“Blight” in the form of low-income and minority residents can expeditiously be removed and the 
property conveyed to parties that will maximize its exchange value on the market. 
 A trend in the 1990s and early 2000s has been to use eminent domain in service of economic 
development projects that attempt to lure private industry to a particular jurisdiction.  Examples abound 
of national corporations seeking prime locations or profitable businesses wanting to increase their 
property holdings asking local governments to exercise the power of eminent domain and acquire the 
desired parcels.  In these instances, businesses hold the carrot of jobs, sales taxes, and increased 
property tax revenues in front of the municipality and threaten with the stick of leaving the jurisdiction 
for another that will prove more amenable to its demands.  Critics of eminent domain argue that these 
“economic development” actions cannot be justified under the “public use” doctrine, even given the low 
standard of judicial review that prevails in eminent domain case law.  In many cases, public monies are 
being used to offer incentives to entirely private interests, and neighborhoods are being destroyed to 
                                                   
57 Ibid., p. 740. 
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justify pursuing the promise of increased revenues from which displaced residents and business 
owners may or may not benefit.  Municipalities play upon the political vulnerability of low-income and 
minority residents in order to maximize profits, and these residents are left with decreased 
opportunities and diminished lives.   
 
Eminent Domain Jurisprudence Prior to Kelo 
The Public Use Controversy 
The most prominent eminent domain cases feature a central element:  the need for judicial 
interpretation of the “public use” wording of federal or state “takings clauses.”  As noted above, it has 
been difficult to determine what the phrase meant in the eighteenth century, and as state courts heard 
cases in the nineteenth century, they gave broad interpretations to the phrase and “vacillated between 
support for an expansive use of eminent domain and a fear that condemnation would be abused to the 
detriment of individual property rights.”58  “Public use” controversies during the nineteenth century often 
involved drainage ditches, mill dams, and transportation routes.  Eminent domain in these cases 
generally could be seen as being linked to potential public use of the condemned property.   In the 
1923 case of Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, though, the Supreme Court determined that “’it was 
not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, should directly enjoy or 
participate in order to constitute a public use.’”59 
 The Court’s broad reading in Rindge Co. gave impetus to the urban renewal movement in the 
mid-twentieth century, in which local governments used the elimination of “blight” to justify the use of 
eminent domain powers and the clearing of large tracts of (usually) central-city land.  This new focus on 
“blight” led to a significant change in state-level eminent domain jurisprudence:  in New York City 
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59 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Housing Authority v. Muller, New York shifted the focus away from the intended “public use” of the 
property to the condition of the property prior to condemnation and the “public good” that eminent 
domain would serve in ending “blighted” conditions.60  Actual “public use” became of less importance 
than the “public purpose” served by the eradication of “blight.”  In 1954, a landmark Supreme Court 
decision, Berman v. Parker, conflated the two terms, and since that time, “public use” has been defined 
broadly by courts at all levels. 
 
Standard of Judicial Review 
 Another major issue in eminent domain cases of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is 
which standard of judicial review should apply to eminent domain cases.  Courts usually apply the 
lowest standard, rational basis review, to most eminent domain cases.  Under this standard, the 
government entity that exercises eminent domain is entitled to a presumption of validity.  This means 
that the court will assume that the government’s actions serve a compelling public interest and are valid 
unless the plaintiff can prove otherwise.  In general, courts are unwilling under this standard to delve 
into motives or question methods so long as they appear rational.  Rational basis review creates a high 
barrier to plaintiffs to overcome, and most eminent domain cases will be decided in favor of the 
government unless a plaintiff can show arbitrary and capricious actions that amount to abuse of the 
eminent domain power. 
 A number of cases have featured plaintiffs calling for a different standard of judicial review.  
They seek heightened scrutiny, or greater inquiry by the court into motives behind the use of eminent 
domain.  In addition, many plaintiffs want a presumption of invalidity to apply to government actions, 
which would shift the burden of proof over to the government and make it responsible for defending its 
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actions to the court.  So far, the Supreme Court has declined to apply heightened scrutiny to any 
eminent domain case. 
 
Supreme Court Cases 
Berman v. Parker (1954) 
 The expansion of the “public use” doctrine was bolstered at the federal level by the Supreme 
Court’s 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker.  The Berman case involved a group of landowners in 
Southwest Washington, D.C. who challenged the District of Columbia’s plan to declare most of the 
city’s southwestern quadrant a “blighted” area, acquire the area through eminent domain, raze the 
properties, and initiate a massive redevelopment project that would replace lower- and middle-class 
communities with upscale housing and federal office space.  This redevelopment project was to be 
conducted primarily by private enterprise after the District conveyed the cleared land to private 
developers.  Berman, the owner of a department store, protested the District’s declaration that his 
property was “blighted,” and challenged the District’s determination to take his property and convey it to 
a private entity for redevelopment.   
In Berman, the Court upheld the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 by giving a 
broad reading of the “public use” clause.  The Court declined to involve itself in Congress’ interpretation 
of “blight” by stating, “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases the legislature, not the 
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.”61  In addition, the 
Court recognized the validity of broad-scale redevelopment and refused to sever Berman’s property 
from the area as a whole.  The Supreme Court’s deferential approach to legislative determinations of 
blight also resulted in a key permutation of the “public use” doctrine:  instead of framing the issue in 
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terms of an ultimate public use, the Court chose to address the question in terms of whether the 
redevelopment project would serve a “public purpose.”62   Thus, Berman “expanded the public use 
concept to include almost any governmental activity in which there is an intention to enlarge public 
resources through capital prosperity, improved private industry, and greater regional employment.”63  
After Berman, only a public benefit determined by the legislature had to be shown to withstand judicial 
scrutiny, and “by leaving the task of identifying the public purpose ends and selecting the means by 
which to achieve those ends to legislative will, the Court gave virtually unfettered eminent domain 
authority to the taking government agency.”64 
 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) 
 Berman controlled the scope of eminent domain power for thirty years, long after the urban 
renewal movement had died away.  In 1984, though, the Supreme Court upheld the “public purpose” 
doctrine and expanded it further in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.  The Midkiff case focused on 
the Hawaii government’s attempt to force private landowners with extensive holdings to sell some of 
their properties in order to open up the land market in the state.65  In Midkiff, the Hawaiian government 
placed itself in the role of encouraging two private entities to negotiate over land and, when 
negotiations failed, endeavoring to “take” the land through eminent domain and convey it to the 
individual who had been renting the land from the owner.  Thus, the government was brokering a deal 
between two private parties and, the plaintiff alleged, could not use eminent domain to further any 
“public purpose.”   
                                                   
62 Ibid., p. 33. 
63 Hellegers, p. 943. 
64 Ibid., p. 944. 
65 In 1984, 22 landowners controlled over 72% of the state’s land.  These individuals had inherited their large holdings from 
ancestors who had been members of the Hawaiian royal family or Hawaiian chiefs.  The concentration of ownership skewed 
Hawaii’s real estate market to the degree that the state government determined that properties had to be sold in order to 
permit equitable access and provide for the public welfare.   
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The Court, however, disagreed with this interpretation.  Following Berman, the Court stated 
that “it [would] not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a public 
use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”66  In addition, the Court declared that 
“the ‘public use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers,” which 
would make the Court’s role in judging the state’s actions “’an extremely narrow one.’”67  It then went 
on to declare that “The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the 
first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose. . . 
. ‘What in its immediate aspect [is] only a private transaction may . . . be raised by its class or character 
to a public affair.’”68  The Midkiff case, therefore, revalidated Berman’s “public purpose” doctrine and 
made it clear that eminent domain may be used for actions that benefit private parties, as long as some 
type of public benefit may attach to the proceeding in the future.  Whether this public benefit is realized 
is not under the purview of the judiciary. 
After Midkiff, governments only had to show that their decisions to use eminent domain were 
based on a speculative benefit to some portion of the public.  Midkiff was decided under a rational 
basis standard of review, and the Court made clear that it would not second-guess the legislature that 
authorized the use of eminent domain or a government’s use of eminent domain pursuant to these 
statutes, as long as the statutes passed Constitutional muster.  No major decision has overturned the 
Midkiff decision.  Therefore, at the federal level, eminent domain jurisprudence permits expansive 
interpretation of the “public use” requirement and allows wide latitude to municipal actions under 
rational basis review. 
 
                                                   
66 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). 
67 Ibid, p. 240. 
68 Ibid., p. 243-244.  The statement quoted by the Court within the quote is from Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 155. 
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Lower Court Cases 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit (1981) 
 One of the most well-known state eminent domain cases came out of Michigan in 1981.  The 
Poletown case centered on General Motors’ demand to the City of Detroit for a large parcel of 
suburban land for a new Cadillac assembly plant.  Without this land, the company intimated, it would be 
forced to move this particular operation away from Detroit, taking over 6,000 jobs with it, because its 
current central city plant was obsolete and would prove too costly to retrofit.  General Motors requested 
that Detroit assemble a rectangular parcel of at least 450 acres that was located along a rail line and 
near a freeway.  The City was to obtain the property through eminent domain and convey it to the 
company for redevelopment.  Detroit found a location that fit the criteria, but it was in an area that 
included a large number of residences, small businesses, and churches.  The neighborhood 
association sued the City over its use of eminent domain, alleging that taking their land and conveying 
it to General Motors for an assembly plant did not constitute “public use” under Michigan’s constitution. 
 The court opened its opinion by framing the issue in a way that was favorable to the City:  “Can 
a municipality use the power of eminent domain granted to it by the Economic Development 
Corporations Act . . . to condemn property for transfer to a private corporation to build a plant to 
promote industry and commerce, thereby adding jobs and taxes to the economic base of the 
municipality and state?”69  The characterization of General Motors’ new plant suggested that the court 
viewed eminent domain for economic development in a positive light, and the court went on to reject 
the plaintiff’s argument that “public use” did not equal “public purpose,” claiming that the terms had 
been used interchangeably in Michigan law “in an effort to describe the protean concept of public 
benefit.”70  In addition, the court approvingly cited the language of the Economic Development 
                                                   
69Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 629 (1981).   
70Ibid, p. 630. 
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Corporations Act, which claimed that retention of local industries and other economic development 
activities “constitute[d] the performance of essential public purposes and functions for th[e] state and its 
municipalities.”71  Thus, “the Legislature has determined that governmental action of the type 
contemplated here meets a public need and serves an essential public purpose.  The Court’s role after 
such a determination is made is limited.”72  The court then ruled in favor of the City of Detroit, citing 
Berman v. Parker as a significant influence (although this federal case law was not controlling).  The 
Poletown court did, however, state that “Our determination that this project falls within the public 
purpose . . . does not mean that every condemnation proposed by an economic development 
corporation will meet with similar acceptance simply because it may provide some jobs or add to the 
industrial or commercial base.  If the public benefit was not so clear and significant, we would hesitate 
to sanction approval of such a project.”73 
 Poletown was a major eminent domain case both for Michigan and other states.  Poletown was 
widely regarded as having overturned years of precedent regarding interpretation of the “public use” 
clause in the state constitution and, as the dissent claimed, creating “judicial mischief” by 
“subordinat[ing] a constitutional right to private corporate interests.”74  Although its precedent only 
applied in Michigan, the case was read by other states as permitting eminent domain for economic 
development purposes.  Local governments in other states explored the limits of “public use” in their 
jurisdictions, and numerous state cases after 1981 referred to the Poletown decision (not as controlling 
precedent, but as persuasive authority). 
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99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency (2001) 
 This California case involved a corporate demand that was similar to the one made by General 
Motors in the Poletown case.  Costco was a major anchor tenant in Lancaster’s “power center” 
shopping complex, and it sought to increase its store area.  Rather than expand to the rear of its leased 
property, Costco and the shopping center owner negotiated with the City of Lancaster to condemn the 
adjacent property, which was leased by 99 Cents Only.  Costco threatened to leave Lancaster if the 
deal did not go through.  The City never informed 99 Cents Only about this plan, and filed to take the 
store’s leasehold property through eminent domain.  99 Cents Only brought suit, alleging that the 
taking was illegal because the City’s plans did not constitute a “public use” of the property.75 
 The court applied rational basis review to the case, following California precedent (and citing 
Midkiff’s example).  This case was viewed as an egregious misuse of eminent domain that would effect 
a transfer of property from one private party for the exclusive benefit of another private party.  
Particularly notable was Lancaster’s defense of “future blight” as a justification for its actions.  Under 
this theory, the City asserted that if the shopping center were to lose Costco as an anchor tenant, 
adjacent businesses would suffer and the shopping center would decline into a “blighted” condition.  
The court disposed of this argument quickly, noting that the City had made no evidentiary findings of 
“future blight” in the eminent domain proceedings, and that the concept of “future blight” has no support 
as a “public use” under California law.76  In a case such as this, “no judicial deference is required . . . 
where the ostensible public use is demonstrably pretextual.”77  Thus, 99 Cents Only stands as a case 
regarding clear eminent domain abuse. 
                                                   
75Although Lancaster stopped the eminent domain action during the litigation, the court refused to grant the City summary 
judgment because it did not believe that the eminent domain issue was moot.  The case continued in the absence of 
eminent domain proceedings because the court suspected that the City might restart the process in the future (perhaps with 
another adjacent property).  The case ended in summary judgment for 99 Cents Only, with the court permanently enjoining 
the City from instituting eminent domain proceedings against the 99 Cents Only property for the purpose of facilitating a 
Costco expansion.  
7699 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (2001).  
77Ibid, p. 1129.  
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Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the City of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales (2001) 
 The Walser case is another case that deals with the use of eminent domain to convey property 
to a large corporation.  Best Buy sought to construct its corporate headquarters in Richfield, MN, a 
suburb of Minneapolis.  The company sought a prime location at the junction of two major highways 
and negotiated with residents and the City to acquire the land.  Although many residents of the area 
eagerly accepted Best Buy’s offer to purchase their properties--especially since Best Buy offered them 
more than the market value of their homes-- Walser Auto Sales resisted Best Buy’s overtures.78  As a 
result, the City of Richfield declared the area “blighted” and instituted condemnation proceedings 
against the auto dealership.  Walser Auto Sales brought suit, alleging its property was not “blighted” 
and that the taking was not for a “public use.” 
 As in the Poletown case, the court determined that “public use” and “public purpose” had 
become synonymous under Minnesota law.  It cited City of Duluth v. State (1986) for the proposition 
that “’even though a public entity, using its eminent domain powers, turns over parcels to a private 
entity for use by that private entity, the condemnation will, nevertheless, be constitutional if a public 
purpose is furthered by such a transfer of land.’”79  The court also examined the City’s findings of 
“blight,” which rested upon “incompatible land uses, such as the proximity of auto dealerships to 
residential areas,” “traffic safety concerns caused by the demonstration driving of cars in the 
neighborhood,” “customers short-cutting through the neighborhood to get to the car dealerships,” and 
“excessive noise, created by APA systems used to contact people out on the car lots.”80  In addition, a 
report on the small businesses in the area concluded that the neighborhood’s commercial spaces were 
“functionally obsolete,” and that the area suffered from the lack of “adequate parking facilities (resulting 
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in cars parked on sidewalks)” and “hazardous traffic patterns.”81  The court accepted this evidence as 
adequate for a finding of a “blighted” area and upheld the City’s use of eminent domain in the project 
area, since the eradication of blight serves a “public purpose.”82  The Walser case often is cited as an 
example of how much latitude statutory definitions of “blight” give to municipal governments who seek 
to use eminent domain. 
 
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, et al. (2002) 
 In this case, an Illinois state redevelopment authority allocated a portion of a bond referendum 
to a private entity to develop a motorsports training complex as part of a local economic development 
project.  The complex created many new jobs for the community and brought racing to a new track that 
seated 50,000 people.  The racing events proved so popular that Gateway, the private corporation that 
developed the motorsports complex, sought to expand its parking facilities.  Although Gateway could 
have constructed a parking garage on its property, it determined that a less expensive alternative 
would be to develop surface parking on an adjacent 148.5-acre tract owned by National City 
Environmental (NCE), a metal recycling business.  NCE refused to discuss a purchase with Gateway, 
and Gateway appealed to the redevelopment authority to use its power of eminent domain to take the 
NCE property and transfer it to Gateway.  The redevelopment authority did so, and NCE brought suit, 
claiming that the redevelopment agency exceeded its authority under the Illinois constitution by taking 
the property and transferring it to Gateway for a parking facility that did not constitute a “public use.” 
 The redevelopment authority argued that its condemnation was legal because a “public 
purpose” would “be served through (1) the fostering of economic development, (2) the promotion of 
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public safety, and (3) the prevention or elimination of blight.”83  Although the court agreed that the line 
between “public use” and “public purpose” had “blurred” over the years, it claimed that a distinction still 
existed in Illinois law.  Citing state precedent, the court stated that under the concept of “public use,” 
“’the public must be to some extent entitled to use or enjoy the property, not as a mere favor or by 
permission of the owner, but by right.’”84  Although the court acknowledged the legitimacy of eminent 
domain as a means of eradicating “blight,” it determined that the new racetrack complex was open to 
the public, “but not ‘by right.’”85  In addition, the court stated that “economic development is an 
important public purpose,” but that Gateway’s proposed parking facility would “result not in a public 
use, but in private profits.”86  In spite of the fact that the new parking facility might create an “expansion 
in revenue [that] could potentially trickle down and bring corresponding revenue increases to the 
region, revenue expansion alone does not justify an improper and unacceptable expansion of the 
eminent domain power of the government.”87  Therefore, the actions of the redevelopment authority 
were found to be illegal under the “public use” doctrine.  This decision is noteworthy due to the 
distinction the court draws between “public use” and “public purpose” and its determination that “public 
use” still required some degree of “by right” access by the public at large.       
         
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, et al. (2004) 
 One of the most recent eminent domain cases is Hathcock, a decision by the Michigan 
Supreme Court that reversed the 1981 Poletown decision.  This case involved Wayne County’s attempt 
to create a 1,300-acre business and technology park on land near Detroit’s airport.  The County 
managed to acquire over 500 acres for the new park, which officials anticipated would create 30,000 
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jobs and bring $350 million in tax revenues for the economically-depressed area.88  Many holdouts 
remained in the proposed project area, and the County determined that the use of eminent domain 
would be necessary for the acquisition of these remaining properties.  The owners of nineteen of these 
parcels sued the County over its use of eminent domain, arguing that the acquisition of their properties 
was not necessary and that the economic development project did not constitute a “public purpose” 
under Michigan law. 
 In deciding Hathcock, the Michigan Supreme Court split its deliberations into two questions:  
(1)  Was the condemnation authorized under state statutes?, and (2) Did the takings violate the 
Michigan constitution?  The controlling state statute, M.C.L. 213.23, authorizes a government agency 
or public corporation “to take private property necessary for a public improvement or for the purposes 
of its incorporation or for public purposes within the scope of its powers for the use or benefit of the 
public . . . .”89  The court used rational basis review in its analysis and determined that Wayne County’s 
stated purposes for condemnation—job creation, increased investment and tax revenues, and support 
for development opportunities—were legitimate objectives under the “public purpose” language of the 
statute.  Therefore, the eminent domain proceedings statutorily were legal. 
 The case hinged, however, on the court’s constitutional analysis.  Even though it had 
determined that Wayne County’s economic development plans did serve a “public purpose” under the 
statute, these same reasons had to be evaluated against the “public use” language in the Michigan 
constitution.  The state’s “takings clause” states that “Private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation therefore being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law.”90  
Constitutional analysis in Michigan rests on “the common understanding of the constitutional text . . . at 
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the time of ratification.”91  This means that a court must determine how the phrase “public use” would 
have been generally understood in 1963, when Michigan voters ratified the latest version of the state 
constitution.  Interestingly, the Hathcock analysis draws upon the Poletown dissent for its examination 
of pre-1963 case law and also uses the dissenting justice’s categories of “public use.”  According to the 
court, in 1963, condemnation of private property and subsequent transfer to a private entity would only 
pass the “public use” test in three instances:  (1) when necessary for commercial activities such as the 
construction of railroads, highways, and canals; (2) when the private entity receiving the property 
remains accountable to the public, such as in the case of a gas or oil pipeline; and (3) when the 
“selection of the land to be condemned is itself based on public concern,” such as “blighted” properties 
that endanger public health and welfare.92  Given these criteria, the court determined that Wayne 
County’s condemnation for office park development did not meet the category of “public use” under the 
state constitution.  Thus, the court invalidated Wayne County’s use of eminent domain. 
 Although Hathcock turned on a unique aspect of Michigan state law (i.e., the state method of 
constitutional interpretation), it was widely viewed as a resounding victory against the use of eminent 
domain for economic development when the government transfers the taken property to a private 
developer.  The Michigan Supreme Court devoted a significant amount of space in the opinion to a 
denunciation of the Poletown decision as bad case law that is “most notable for its radical and 
unabashed departure from the entirety of this Court’s pre-1963 eminent domain jurisprudence.”93  
According to the court, “Poletown’s ‘economic benefit’ rationale would validate practically any exercise 
of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private entity.  After all, if one’s ownership of private 
property is forever subject to the government’s determination that another private party would put one’s 
land to better use, then the ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion plans 
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of any large discount retailer, ‘megastore,’ or the like.”94  In breaking with Poletown, though, the 
Michigan Supreme Court did not entirely rule out the use of eminent domain for economic development 
(i.e., it still may be legal as long as it falls into the three “public use” categories outlined by the court).  
This is a subtlety of the decision that escaped some members of the press and public, but the 
Hathcock decision’s overturning of precedent strengthened property rights arguments across the 
United States and created an atmosphere that led many groups to believe that the Supreme Court’s 
line of eminent domain jurisprudence might be ripe for overturning.       
 
The Kelo Controversy 
 In late 2000, the Kelo case began in the lower Connecticut state courts.  Little attention initially 
was paid to this case, which challenged the City of New London’s initiation of condemnation 
proceedings against a small group of holdout landowners.  As it worked its way up through the courts, 
however, Kelo began to attract as much notice as the Hathcock case in Michigan, primarily because it 
turned on the central issue of whether governments could condemn property for economic 
development purposes.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut heard the case in 2004, and upheld the 
City’s action.  The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari in 2004, and heard the case in February 
2005. 
 
Kelo v. The City of New London (2005):  The Facts of the Case 
 In the last decades of the twentieth century, New London, Connecticut experienced a severe 
economic decline due to the loss of its industrial base.  In 1990, the state declared it a “distressed 
municipality,” and in 1996, the city suffered a significant economic setback when the Naval Undersea 
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Warfare Center closed, causing a loss of over 1,500 jobs.95  By 1998, unemployment had risen to a 
level twice that of the state average, and the city’s population had dropped to the lowest level since 
1920.  City leaders saw the need for long-term economic development planning, and they focused their 
efforts on the Fort Trumbull area, which was adjacent to the waterfront.  In 1998, they reactivated the 
New London Economic Development Corporation (NLDC) and issued over $15 million in bonds to 
facilitate the NLDC’s planning activities and to create the Fort Trumbull State Park.   
Shortly after this bond issue, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals announced that it planned to construct a 
$300 million research facility adjacent to the proposed Fort Trumbull State Park.  The City seized on 
this opportunity and began creating a long-range community revitalization plan, hoping that the Pfizer 
project would catalyze investment in the Fort Trumbull area.  In 2000, they finalized a plan that was 
“’projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an 
economically distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.’”96  This planning effort 
focused mainly on seven large development parcels within a 90-acre planning area.  Parcel 1 was 
designated for a waterfront hotel, retail center, riverwalk, and marina.  Parcel 2 was to be the location 
of a small “urban village” comprised of 80 new residential units and a U.S. Coast Guard Museum, and 
Parcel 3 was to contain over 90,000 square feet of research and development space (intended to 
complement the Pfizer facility).  Parcel 4 was intended for park and/or marina “support,” which might 
include parking areas, and Parcels 5, 6, and 7 were slated for office and retail development.  The City 
Council approved this plan in January 2000. 
The NLDC spent most of 2000 negotiating purchases with landowners in the development 
parcels.  Most of these negotiations were successful, but by late 2000, nine holdouts remained.  These 
individuals owned 15 properties in the proposed development area, ten of which were occupied by the 
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owner or a close family member, and five of which were investment properties.  Many of these owners 
had resided in the Fort Trumbull area for years and were unwilling to let go of their properties due to 
strong emotional associations.  The City began condemnation proceedings against these owners in 
November 2000.  No findings of “blight” were made against these properties; instead, the City relied 
upon a Connecticut statute that determined that the taking of land for economic development projects 
constituted a “public use” and was in the “public interest.”97  In December 2000, the owners filed suit, 
alleging that the City’s actions violated the “Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment and requesting 
that the taking of the properties be enjoined.  Their legal action claimed that the takings were not a 
permissible “public use” because the City planned to lease the parcels to a private developer for 
redevelopment under the new plan.  At the time of filing, the City had not selected a particular 
developer to undertake the redevelopment project.   
The New London Superior Court granted a permanent injunction against the taking of 
properties in Parcel 4 (the park “support” parcel), but refused to issue injunctions regarding the other 
properties, all of which lay in the proposed Parcel 3 (scheduled for research and development space).  
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, which upheld the takings under the 
Connecticut statutes relied upon by the City and which also used Berman and Midkiff to determine that 
economic development constituted a valid “public use” under the Constitution.98  Interestingly, the three 
dissenting justices concurred in the determination that New London’s economic development plan was 
a valid “public use,” but found all of the takings unconstitutional because not enough evidence existed 
that the proposed benefits of the plan would ever be realized.99 
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The Majority Opinion   
 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Breyer, 
Ginsberg, and Souter.  The Court initially considered the question of “public use” and determined that a 
long line of precedent, culminating with Berman and Midkiff, held that “public use” did not necessarily 
mean that the seized property literally had to be used by the public or made available to the public 
through a common carrier.  Instead, the Court recognized that when it “’began applying the Fifth 
Amendment to the States at the close of the nineteenth century, it embraced the broader and more 
natural interpretation of public use as “public purpose.”’”100  Therefore, “the disposition of [Kelo] . . . 
turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”101  The Court 
noted that the “public purpose” concept is broad, and that it “reflect[s] our longstanding policy of 
deference to legislative judgments in this field.”102  Thus, instead of applying a mechanical test for 
“public use,” the Court should follow precedent and “esche[w] rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in 
favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the 
takings power.”103 
 In its analysis of whether New London’s actions met the “public purpose” requirement, the 
Court noted with approval that the City had “carefully formulated an economic development plan that it 
believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no means limited to—
new jobs and increased revenue.”104  This language proves important to the decision, because it 
reflects the majority’s view that the condemnation proceeding and subsequent lease of the property to 
a private developer was not just confined to an economic development purpose.  Although the City 
invoked the authority of the Connecticut statute that authorizes the use of eminent domain for the 
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promotion of economic development projects, the Court suggests that other components of the plan, 
such as the proposed marina and state park, help distinguish New London’s eminent domain action 
use as more than just an act undertaken in order to generate increased tax revenue.  This, combined 
with the comprehensiveness of New London’s economic development plan, the fact that it had been 
created over time and had been subject to public review before adoption, and the “limited scope of 
review” mandated by precedent, led the Court to declare that the “plan unquestionably serves a public 
purpose.”105  
 The plaintiffs, in their brief, had urged the Court to adopt a bright-line test that would bar 
government entities from using eminent domain for economic development purposes.  They asked the 
Court to use Michigan’s Hathcock case as persuasive authority, but the majority refused to follow this 
line of thought.106  The Court reiterated its judgment that the New London case did not present an 
exclusive economic development scenario (and thus that question was not before the Court), but it did 
state that “promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of 
government.”107  The Court also cited several historical cases, including Berman, and declared that  
these cases also involved economic development as a secondary component.  In a footnote, the Court 
claimed that “It is a misreading of Berman to suggest that the only public use upheld in that case was 
the initial removal of blight. . . . The public use described in Berman extended beyond that to 
encompass the purpose of developing that area to create conditions that would prevent a reversion to 
blight in the future.”108  Interestingly, the Court left open the question of whether it would have  judged 
in the same manner an eminent domain proceeding and subsequent transfer to a private party solely 
for economic development:  “Had the public use in Berman  been defined more narrowly, it would have 
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been difficult to justify the taking of the plaintiff’s nonblighted department store.”109  In addition, the 
statement that “a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside of the confines of an integrated 
development plan, is not presented in this case,” may signal a willingness for the Court to rule 
differently on another set of facts in the future.  If a case is presented in which a government entity 
executes a taking and transfer of the property to a developer for an economic development project that 
is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan, this may be deemed an arbitrary action that cannot be 
construed as being for a “public purpose.” 
 The Court also addressed another key argument made by the plaintiffs:  speculative future 
benefits cannot be considered a valid “public use.”  The plaintiffs wanted the Court to “require a 
‘reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits will actually accrue.”110  In the Court’s opinion, 
however, this type of rule would cut against established precedent.  In refusing to adopt this test, the 
Court quoted from the Midkiff decision:  “’When the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means 
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less 
than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation—are not to be carried out in 
the federal courts.’”111  Deference to legislative action is necessary (given the assumption of validity 
attached to government actions under rational basis review) in order to maintain the balance of power 
between the three branches of government.  Delving into the motives of the legislature or questioning 
the efficacy of its chosen method of action would constitute overreaching by the Court.  The Court 
therefore upheld the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision that the City of New London’s actions 
were permissible under state and federal law. 
 After announcing its holding, the Court inserted a small discussion about the potential impacts 
of its decision.  It emphasized the distinction between the federal “Takings Clause” and state legislative 
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and constitutional requirements, stating that “Nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”112  The availability of statutory and constitutional 
amendments provides a means of altering the outcome of the Court’s opinion if state legislatures 
disagree with the broad holding.  According to the Court, “As the submissions of the parties and their 
amici make clear, the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic 
development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate.”113  This language emphasizes the need 
for the question to be decided by a body that is politically accountable to the people, not by a high court 
that is staffed by lifetime political appointees. 
 
The Concurrence 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy provided the swing vote in Kelo, siding with the majority, but writing a 
separate concurring opinion.  Kennedy’s concurrence explicitly addresses an issue of which the 
majority made no mention:  the appropriate standard of review for takings cases.  According to 
Kennedy, takings precedent establishes a rational basis standard of review, but “a court applying 
rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, 
is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits . . . .”114   
Kennedy reviewed the evidence presented and found that the fact that the City operated under a 
development plan and did not select a particular developer to which to transfer the taken property prior 
to the eminent domain proceeding suggests that the primary motive was not to enrich a particular 
private interest.  In addition, he addressed the allegation that the City intended the entire economic 
development project to lure Pfizer to the Fort Trumbull area, concluding that the lower courts had been 
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correct in determining that the City’s “primary motivation . . . was to take advantage of Pfizer’s 
presence.”115  Therefore, the eminent domain proceeding survived rational basis review and was a 
valid “public use.” 
 Kennedy also addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the Court should adopt a bright-line test 
regarding the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes.  The plaintiffs encouraged 
the Court to adopt a new standard that would presume that the actions of a government entity were 
invalid in an economic development takings case.  Under this standard, the government entity would 
bear the burden of proving that its actions were justified.  Kennedy, however, countered their argument 
by questioning statements that they made about the Berman and Midkiff cases:   
Petitioners overstate the need for such a rule, however, by making the incorrect  
assumption that review under Berman and Midkiff  imposes no meaningful judicial  
limits on the government’s power to condemn any property it likes.  A broad per se 
rule or a strong presumption of invalidity, furthermore, would prohibit a large number 
of government takings that have the purpose and expected effect of conferring 
substantial benefits on the public at large and so do not offend the Public Use Clause.116          
 
 Kennedy’s concurrence is intriguing due to his suggestion that in the future, the Court may 
wish to adopt a higher standard of review for some takings cases.  Although he agrees with the 
majority that current case law does not mandate this and that the City’s actions survive rational basis 
review, he states that this  
does not foreclose the possibility that a more stringent standard of review than 
that announced in Berman and Midkiff might be appropriate for a more narrowly  
drawn category of takings.  There may be private transfers in which the risk of  
undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption 
(rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause. . . . 
This demanding level of scrutiny, however, is not required simply because the  
purpose of the taking is economic development.117  
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Therefore, Kennedy also shies away from a bright-line test regarding economic development, but offers 
dicta which suggest a possible narrowing of takings precedent. 
 
The Dissents 
 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor authored the main dissent, which was joined by Justice Scalia 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist.  According to O’Connor, the Court’s holding marks a change in takings 
law.  She asserts that  
 Today the Court abandons [a[ long-held, basic limitation on government power. 
 Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now  
 vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as 
 it might be upgraded—i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the 
 legislature deems more beneficial to the public—in the process.  To reason, as  
the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent 
ordinary use of private property render economic development takings “for public 
use” is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property— 
and thereby effectively to delete the words “for public use” from the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.118   
 
In support of this passionate opening, O’Connor offers a re-reading of the majority opinion that she 
wrote in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.  This is done on the basis of “errant language” in this 
opinion that conflated the power of eminent domain with the police power of the state.  She claims that 
in both Berman and Midkiff, “the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted 
affirmative harm on society—in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty and in Midkiff 
through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth.”119  In each case, “a public purpose was realized when 
the harmful use was eliminated.  Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not 
matter that the property was turned over to private use.”120  Therefore, under this new interpretation, 
proof of social harm is required when a property is condemned and subsequently transferred to a 
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private party for redevelopment.  O’Connor claims that the City of New London did not provide any 
evidence of pre-condemnation social harm, because no evidentiary findings were made regarding 
“blight” or conditions that would endanger the public welfare.  Thus, the eminent domain procedure did 
not constitute a “public use” under the Constitution. 
 O’Connor also complains that Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the Court should impose 
stricter scrutiny in some takings cases is not accompanied by an explanation of “how courts are to 
conduct this complicated inquiry.”121  Kennedy’s “as-yet-undisclosed test,” she claims, is “theoretically 
flawed” because “If it is true that incidental public benefits from new private use are enough to ensure 
the ‘public purpose’ in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what 
inspired the taking in the first place? . . . And whatever the reason for a given condemnation, the effect 
is the same from the constitutional perspective—private property is forcibly relinquished to new private 
ownership.”122   
 In addition, O’Connor takes issue with what she calls a logical conclusion of the majority’s 
decision:  “that eminent domain may only be used to upgrade—not downgrade—property.”123  Since 
the Court cannot involve itself in “predictive judgments” about whether any potential benefits actually 
will materialize, she believes that the majority’s holding leaves all property owners vulnerable to 
government power:  “For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive 
possible use of her property?  The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.  Nothing is to 
prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or 
any farm with a factory.”124  O’Connor believes that correct interpretation of the “public use” concept 
provides more safeguards to property owners, particularly those who lack political power.  She predicts 
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that the majority’s decision will result in takings that benefit “those citizens with disproportionate 
influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms.”125  
Therefore, the Kelo holding will jeopardize all private property and pervert the intentions of the Framers 
of the Constitution by allowing virtually unfettered government takings power. 
 Justice Clarence Thomas filed an additional dissent in which he applied a strict constructionist 
argument to the case.126  The bulk of his dissent analyzes constitutional language and recounts the 
case law history surrounding eminent domain.  Thomas believes that “the Public Use Clause is most 
naturally read to authorize takings for public use only if the government or the public actually uses the 
taken property”; therefore, “our current Public Use Clause jurisprudence . . . has rejected this natural 
reading of the Clause.”127  Since modern takings case law misreads the “takings clause,” “this Court’s 
reliance by rote on this standard is ill advised and should be reconsidered.”128 
 At the end of his dissent, Justice Thomas focuses on the implications of the majority’s holding.  
He claims that “Once one permits takings for public purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent 
principle limits what could constitute a valid public use—at least, none beyond . . . the text of the 
Constitution itself.”129  Without the proper limitations of the Public Use Clause, “extending the concept 
of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall 
disproportionately on poor communities.  Those communities are not only systematically less likely to 
put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”130 
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Because the majority’s decision is most likely to impact “powerless groups and individuals,” a stricter 
standard of review should be required in order to protect their interests.131   
 
 
The Aftermath of Kelo 
The Reaction to the Decision  
 The 5-4 decision that was handed down in June 2005 sparked an immediate and fierce 
reaction, particularly in non-legal circles.  The Kelo decision demonstrated a respect for precedent and 
logically followed a line of takings jurisprudence that stretched back to the nineteenth century; 
therefore, “the initial reaction by lawyers familiar with the case was one of unsurprise.”132  Members of 
the media, though, latched on to Justice O’Connor’s heated language in her dissent, and articles that 
grossly simplified the decision rapidly appeared.  Headlines such as “Homes May Be ‘Taken’ for 
Private Projects” trumpeted the idea that the Kelo decision had destroyed the sanctity of the American 
home and undermined all private property rights.133  Internet forums buzzed about the injustice 
contained in the decision, and legislators around the country quickly took notice.  Many of these early 
reactions treated the Kelo decision as a landmark case that radically altered American eminent domain 
law, generally reducing to the idea that “cities now have wide power to bulldoze residences for projects 
such as shopping malls and hotel complexes in order to generate tax revenue.”134  Few stopped to note 
the interaction of federal and state law, and even fewer realized that the decision changed almost 
nothing in terms of what was legally permitted under the Constitution. 
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 The volume and the tone of the reaction to Kelo can only be described as a major backlash, 
fueled by what Professor Thomas W. Merrill identifies as “five myths about Kelo”: 
1. Kelo breaks new ground by authorizing the use of eminent domain solely  
for economic development; 
  
2. Kelo authorizes condemnations where the only justification is a change in 
use of the property that will create new jobs or generate higher tax revenues; 
 
3. Kelo dilutes the standard of review for determining whether a particular taking 
is for a public use; 
 
4. The original understanding of the Takings Clause limits the use of eminent 
domain to cases of government ownership or public access; and 
 
5. Takings for economic development pose a particular threat to “discrete and 
insular minorities.”135 
  
What is distinctive about this reaction is the degree to which it has mobilized state legislatures to 
consider laws meant to curb the eminent domain powers of state agencies and local governments.   
As Justice Stevens noted in the majority opinion, states do have the right to enact laws that prove more 
restrictive than the Supreme Court’s decision.  By November 2005, more than half of the states and the 
United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate had pending legislation 
intended to limit the use of eminent domain.  
  
State Responses 
Several states, such as Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, 
and Texas, sought to address the issue through amendments to their state constitutions that would bar 
the use of eminent domain for private development projects.136  Others introduced legislation that 
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would provide limits in different ways.  In Delaware, the House and Senate passed a bill that would 
restrict the ultimate project use to a “recognized public use.”137  Utah removed the authority of 
economic development agencies to use eminent domain for property acquisition.138  Massachusetts 
looked at a bill to prohibit the taking of private property unless the property is deemed a “blighted” 
area.139  Alabama unanimously passed a bill that would proscribe the use of eminent domain for “retail, 
office, commercial, or residential development.”140  In addition, Georgia considered a bill that would 
prohibit the use of eminent domain in projects intended to improve tax revenues.141  
 Legislation pending before the Pennsylvania House and Senate attempts to address both 
economic development projects and definitions of “blight.”  Pennsylvania Senate Bill 881 would prohibit 
the use of eminent domain for “private enterprise,” which is defined as “a for-profit or not-for-profit entity 
or organization” that is not a purely “public charity.”142  Exceptions only would be permitted for 
situations in which the “condemnee consents to the use of the property for private enterprise,” for use 
by common carriers, for condemnations by a housing authority or urban redevelopment authority, and 
in situations that pose a threat to public health or safety.143  In addition, a property can only be declared 
“blighted” if it is regarded as a public nuisance; is an attractive nuisance; is “dilapidated, unsanitary, 
unsafe, vermin-infested,” or in violation of housing codes; is a fire hazard; is abandoned; has been tax 
delinquent for two years; “has become a place for accumulation of trash and debris or a haven for 
rodents or other vermin”; or has “environmentally hazardous conditions.”144  Pennsylvania House Bill 
                                                   
137 Corkery, Michael, and Ryan Chittum.  2005.  “Eminent-Domain Uproar Imperils Projects.”  The Wall Street Journal 
(online edition).  Retrieved 14 September 2005 from http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112301915571102998-
Xc3eIBhdk1ZdhLGFTbec64ZqkmY_20060804.html?mod=todays_free_feature_archive. 
 
138 Baldas, p. 2. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid and Community Development Digest (August 9, 2005):  5. 
141 Baldas, p. 2. 
142 Pennsylvania Senate Bill No. 881, §§ 202 and 204 (2005).  
143 Ibid, § 204. 
144 Ibid, § 205. 
       50
2054 poses similar restrictions, with the exception that eminent domain is prohibited for “private 
commercial enterprise,” which is not listed in the definitions section, but is designated as not including 
“a hospital or medical center that is operated not for profit.”145 
 The Pennsylvania bills have come under attack from some advocacy groups, such as 10,000 
Friends of Pennsylvania, which urges legislators to temper their rush to pass legislation that responds 
to Kelo:   
We support the thorough analysis of the use of eminent domain in Pennsylvania 
to ensure that it is being applied fairly and toward the improvement of our  
communities.  Both chambers have only begun to analyze laws that have been  
in place for 60 years in Pennsylvania.  Reacting—and voting—swiftly and without  
a full understanding of the use of eminent domain in the state or the implication 
or proposed changes may result in extremes in both policy and outcome.146 
 
The policy statement issued by 10,000 Friends of Pennsylvania highlights eight concerns about the 
pending legislation: 
1. The proposals should respond to Pennsylvania’s situation, not Connecticut’s; 
 
2. Eminent domain is an important tool for revitalization, through its judicious use 
to assemble parcels large enough for urban redevelopment; 
 
3. Declining downtowns need public incentives for private development; the 
Commonwealth should encourage private investment, not chase it away; 
 
4. The definition of blight should be consistent across state laws, or it will 
promote sprawl development; 
 
5. The proposals should consider all property owners’ rights, not just the rights 
of a few; 
 
6. Any proposed changes should be applied uniformly; 
 
7. The proposals would force communities to wait until they reach the point of 
no return before using eminent domain; and 
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8. Public participation and safeguards for rights are already built into the process.147 
 
 
These concerns may be generalized beyond Pennsylvania to pending legislation in other states.  Many 
advocacy groups and planning professionals feel that Kelo has initiated a wave of state legislation that, 
although intended to protect individual property rights, may have unintended long-term consequences 
for community development and the economic health of different jurisdictions. 
 
The Federal Response 
 In September 2005, the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a set of 
hearings called “The Kelo Decision:  Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property.”  
Suzette Kelo, the lead plaintiff in the Kelo case, addressed the committee and urged its members to 
“’do what judges and local legislators so far have refused to do for me and for thousands of people like 
me across the nation:  protect our homes.’”148  In addition, she claimed that her personal battle against 
the City of New London “’has rightfully grown into something much larger—the fight to restore the 
American Dream and the sacredness and security of each one of our homes.’”149  Other testimony was 
offered, particularly by legal experts, but Ms. Kelo’s emotional speech appears to have had an impact 
on Congress.   
On November 3, the United States House of Representatives passed a bill by a margin of 376-
38 that will impose limits on federal funding of projects that use eminent domain.150  This bill, titled the 
Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, contains sections prohibiting “eminent domain abuse” 
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by the states and federal government.151  In both, eminent domain may not be exercised “over property 
to be used for economic development or over property that is subsequently used for economic 
development”; for a state or local government, this is qualified by whether it “receives Federal 
economic development funds during any fiscal year in which it does so.”152  If a state or local 
government engages in this prohibited practice, it will become ineligible for any federal economic 
development funds for the next two fiscal years.153  The bill also contains special sections that provide 
the same protection for agricultural lands and religious and non-profit organizations, all of which 
apparently are considered vulnerable to takings due to the fact that they are either tax-exempt or may 
have a lower rate of taxation.  Under this bill, “economic development” means “taking private property, 
without the consent of the owner, and conveying or leasing such property from one private person or 
entity to another private person or entity for commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase 
tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general economic health,” but carries the exceptions of public 
ownership, common carriers, public utilities, harmful land uses, abandoned property, or “leasing 
property to a private person or entity that occupies an incidental part of public property or a public 
facility.”154  It is unclear whether “economic development” has to be the primary reason for a project in 
order for the penalty to attach.  In addition, “federal economic funds” is defined broadly as “any Federal 
funds distributed to or through States or political subdivisions of States . . . designed to improve or 
increase the size of the economies of States or political subdivisions.”155 Opponents of this bill argued 
that the sweeping definition of economic development would stymie important revitalization efforts, and 
that land use matters fundamentally are local issues, not issues that should be intruded upon by broad 
federal legislation. 
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Consequences of the Decision 
The Kelo Ruling 
 As noted above, the Supreme Court’s actual ruling on Kelo altered very little in takings law.  
After Kelo, Berman and Midkiff remain as modern controlling precedent, the standard of review is still 
rational basis review, and “public use” continues to be read broadly to include “public purpose.”  In 
many ways, this is a conservative decision that shows great respect for precedent and respects the 
rights of the states to make decisions involving issues that are unique to their circumstances.  It is 
ironic that political conservatives and members of the property rights movement decry the ruling as a 
testament to liberal support of “big government.”  Although the decision does uphold broad government 
discretion, it neither limits nor expands it.  As before, only abuses of eminent domain will be illegal 
under Kelo.  Kelo is a very static decision that, in many ways, only causes a ripple in takings 
jurisprudence. 
 
The Reaction to Kelo 
 The popular and political response to Kelo has been surprisingly strong, remarkably 
misdirected, and intriguing in terms of the unexpected alliances and divisions that it has engendered.  
Conservatives and liberals have joined forces against the Kelo decision, bringing together ardent 
property rights advocates who oppose “big government” and advocates for the poor and politically 
disempowered groups who fervently believe in the power of government to ameliorate social ills.  To 
see liberal support for a position taken by Justices Scalia and Thomas is rare indeed.  In addition, the 
decision has divided the ranks of planning professionals, some of whom support the argument 
advanced by Justice O’Connor, and others who view state and local government discretion as 
necessary for major planning activities. 
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 As the “myths of Kelo” continue and prompt narrow, reflexive legislative action, the planning 
profession and the public may see significant long-term consequences that do not bode well for future 
quality of life, especially in urban areas.  The reaction to Kelo cuts against one of the dispositive 
elements cited by the majority:  the importance of comprehensive development plans.  New statutory 
limitations on eminent domain—particularly something as stringent as the new Alabama law—may 
make it difficult and costly for local governments to engage in growth planning.  Without the ability to 
ensure that large parcels of land may be assembled through condemnation proceedings, there may be 
little point in creating redevelopment plans for a broad area, such as Fort Trumbull.  As 10,000 Friends 
of Pennsylvania points out, “investors cannot be attracted into risky markets without an assurance that 
investment will reach ‘critical mass’ stage.”156  Being unable to eliminate holdouts can place 
governments in an untenable position, for no developer will want to take on a project without 
guarantees for reasonably-priced land acquisition, and most local governments are not in a position to 
become lead developers of revitalization projects.   
 Justice O’Connor’s argument in her dissent appears to sanction the use of eminent domain for 
economic development projects that occur on “blighted” properties.  Many of the state reactions to Kelo 
have followed her line of reasoning, creating exceptions for properties with severe disinvestment.  
Although this will provide latitude for many large-scale redevelopment projects, it may also have the 
unintended consequence of exacerbating pressures on low-income residents in central city areas 
(which, ironically, Justice O’Connor sought to alleviate in her dissent).  The proscription on economic 
development projects in non-“blighted” areas will deter greenfield development if parcel assemblage is 
too costly.  If local governments have to justify economic development projects through findings of 
“blight,” they logically will promote projects in poorer areas.  In addition, they may have to wait until 
these areas meet the definition of “blight,” which could make conditions worse within the potential 
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project area.  Although projects in “blighted” areas could have the effect of revitalizing neighborhoods, 
they will also dislocate large numbers of low-income residents who cluster in low-rent areas.  Unless 
guarantees are made that low-income residents will all have housing in the new project, politically-
powerless individuals will be disproportionately affected.  Middle- and upper-class residents who do not 
reside in “blighted” areas and who can afford new units in a redevelopment project, though, can rest 
assured that their properties will not be taken under Justice O’Connor’s reasoning. 
 At the same time, it is possible that new state restrictions on eminent domain could work to 
promote sprawl and undermine Smart Growth efforts in many communities.  If parcel assemblage is an 
issue in an urban redevelopment project, investors may be unwilling to commit to the project, since 
they know that high acquisition costs may lie ahead without the availability of eminent domain.  Instead, 
greenfield development, where large parcels may be acquired at lower costs, may prove more 
attractive.  This could have the effect of driving private investment away from central cities and inner-
ring suburbs.  Communities that are working to contain suburban development by redirecting 
investment to central urban areas may find themselves unable to carry out their Smart Growth plans. 
 Another potential problem for planners is differences in state law that may discourage 
investment in one state, while making investment in a neighboring jurisdiction more attractive.  If a state 
adopts a highly-restrictive law regarding eminent domain and economic development and an adjacent 
state does not have these restrictions, a major private investor may find itself more willing to commit to 
a project in the less-restrictive state.  In a global market where communities find themselves fighting 
frantically for competitive economic advantages, this may bring significant risks of economic decline 
(and limitations on how a community can address this decline).   
 In addition, federal legislation that would effectively punish communities for using eminent 
domain in economic development projects may significantly discourage redevelopment projects.  Since 
it is unclear whether any type of economic development will trigger the withholding of federal funds 
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(even if economic development is a secondary benefit of the project), local governments may be wary 
of planning projects that could include the use of eminent domain.  Many large-scale projects cannot 
occur without federal funds, and it is unclear from the definition of “economic development funds” in the 
House bill whether this includes Community Development Block Grant funds.  If so, local governments 
may find it virtually impossible to conduct many types of redevelopment projects that involve mixed-use 
development (since commercial uses could be seen as efforts to increase the tax base and/or as 
impermissible benefits to private parties). 
 One other long-term effect of the Kelo reaction may involve creeping limits on the discretion of 
local governments.  If states introduce presumptions of invalidity in judicial review of eminent domain 
actions, it may be easy for this presumption also to be introduced in other areas.  Such a practice 
would blur the line between the different levels and branches of government.  One of the reasons that 
the presumption of validity exists for local land-use actions is because these decisions are seen as 
being based on local conditions.  It is not the place of a court or a state to inquire too deeply into what a 
local government chooses to do with the enabling legislation.  Land-use decisions at the local level 
respond to unique conditions that the state or a court is not in a position fully to understand.  Instituting 
a presumption of invalidity, therefore, would detract from a local government’s ability to deal with 
highly-localized conditions.  Planners and governing officials could significantly be constrained by a 
tightening of the standard of judicial review required in eminent domain or other land-use cases. 
 
Future Directions 
 The pace of legislative action after the Kelo decision should slow so that adequate time may be 
given to a detailed re-evaluation of current eminent domain law in different states.  No law exists 
outside of a framework of others, and special attention must be paid to context and the reach of a 
concept in state law.  For example, provisions about “blighted” properties are not confined solely to a 
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section of eminent domain statutes in most states.  Eminent domain,“blight,” urban redevelopment, 
economic development, and tax increment financing statutes all are intricately intertwined.  A change in 
one statutory series may necessitate changes in others.  It would be rash to alter singular provisions 
and have contradictory terms or gaps in procedures on the books.   
 In addition, other courses of action may be pursued beyond prohibitive regulatory measures.  
Alterations in compensatory measures could bring an additional element of fairness to the eminent 
domain process.  Most state law provides only compensation equal to the fair market value of a 
property and relocation expenses.  New compensation formulas could be derived that might provide 
payment for social and emotional costs, although admittedly this would be difficult to value in the 
marketplace.  Another related compensatory mechanism could be the inclusion of “clawback 
provisions” in contracts with private developers.  These contractual clauses would provide 
compensation for local governments if developers failed to follow through on their plans, or if an 
economic development project significantly failed to generate promised jobs and revenue. 
 A different type of solution could involve what Thomas Merrill defines as “procedural 
reforms.”157  This strategy would provide greater accountability to the public by ensuring that eminent 
domain could only be undertaken by local or state officials who hold elective office.  State and local 
agencies, such as redevelopment authorities or turnpike authorities, would no longer have the power to 
make unilateral decisions with the assurance that no political consequences would result.  In addition, 
Merrill suggests that the elimination of “quick take” procedures, which put the burden on landowners to 
file suit before the government can institute a condemnation and to prove that the government’s action 
does not constitute a “public use,” would help redress eminent domain abuse.158 
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 Another future direction involves a radically different measure:  bringing an eminent domain 
case with different facts before the Supreme Court.  The majority opinion made several suggestions 
that a case that did not involve a comprehensive redevelopment plan or ancillary uses (such as a park 
and a marina) might relate to the “public purpose” concept in a different manner.  Although the Court 
probably would resist overturning eminent domain precedent, its relatively narrow decision points to 
room for future cases involving eminent domain and economic development.  A different case might 
result in a broad statement about eminent domain and economic development, but a more practical 
outcome would be alteration in the present standard of review.  Even without a bright-line test 
regarding eminent domain and economic development, future plaintiffs could benefit from a heightened 
level of scrutiny in takings cases. 
 
Conclusions 
 The Kelo decision has become a paradoxical legal decision.  It reads as a fairly routine 
upholding of precedent; however, its outcome has been the catalyst for a surprisingly-strong public 
reaction and intense legislative activity.  Spurred by Justice O’Connor’s dissent, which provides a 
revisionary reading of precedent and hyperbolic language that glosses over many of the subtleties of 
the majority’s opinion, public opinion now views Kelo as a watershed moment in the history of 
American property rights.  Egregious oversimplifications have made Kelo into a banner case for the 
growing property rights movement, and the aftermath of the decision points to how strong this 
movement has become.  Politicians now are proceeding to bolster political standing by pushing through 
reflexive legislation that may prove harmful to local governments’ future planning activities and 
economies.  Little time has been taken for comprehensive studies and public input regarding new 
prohibitory legislation at the state and federal levels of government.            
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   The Kelo case has also demonstrated how little the public and many professionals in the 
planning profession know about the structure and process of the American legal system.  It is only in a 
nation unaware of the basic relationship between state and federal law that an explosion of the 
magnitude associated with Kelo could occur.  The American media, politicians, and public have turned 
Kelo, despite its lack of new legal direction, into a landmark decision. 
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